This paper considers point to point secure communi cation over flat fading channels under an outage constraint. More
specifically, we extend the definition of outage capacity to account for the secrecy constraint and obtain sharp characterizations of the corresponding fundamental limits under two different assumptions on the transmitter CSI (Channel state information).
First, we find the outage secrecy capacity assuming that the trans mitter has perfect knowledge of the legitimate and eavesdropper channel gains. In this scenario, the capacity achieving scheme relies on opportunistically exchanging private keys between the legitimate nodes. These keys are stored in a key buffer and later used to secure delay sensitive data using the Vernam's one time pad technique. We then extend our results to the more practical scenario where the transmitter is assumed to know only the legitimate channel gain. Here, our achievability arguments rely on privacy amplification techniques to generate secret key bits. In the two cases, we also characterize the optimal power control policies which, interestingly, turn out to be a judicious combination of channel inversion and the optimal ergodic strategy. Finally, we analyze the effect of key buffer overflow on the overall outage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure communication is a topic that is becoming increas ingly important thanks to the proliferation of wireless devices.
Over the years, several secrecy protocols have been developed an d inco r porated in several wireless standards; e.g., the IEEE 802.1 1 specifications for Wi-Fi. However, as new schemes are being developed, methods to counter the specifi c techniques also appear. Breaking this cycle is critically dependent on the design of protocols that offer provable secrecy guarantees. The information theoretic secrecy paradigm adopted here, allows for a systematic approach for the design of low complexity an d provable secrecy protocols that fully exploit the intrinsic properties of the wireless medium.
Most of the recent work on inform ation theoretic secrecy is, arguably, inspired by Wyner's wiretap channel [2] . In this setup, a passive eavesdropper listens to the communication between two legitimate nodes over a separate communication channel. While attempting to decipher the message, no limit is imposed on the computational resources available to the eavesdropper. This assumption led to defi ning perfect secrecy capacity as the maximum achievable rate subject to zero mu tual information rate between the transmitted message and the signal received by the eavesdropper. In the additive Gaussian noise scenario [3] , the perfect secrecy capacity turned out to be the difference between the capacities of the legitimate an d eavesdropper channels. Therefore, if the eavesdropper channel has a higher channel gain, information theoretic secure communication is not possible over the main channel. Recent works have shown how to exploit multipath fading to avoid this limitation [4] , [5] , [7] . The basic idea is to opportun isti cally exploit th e instants when th e main channel observes a higher gain than the eavesdropper channel to exchange secure messages. This opportunistic secrecy approach was shown to achieve non-zero ergodic secrecy capacity even when on average the eavesdropper channel has favorable conditions over the legitimate channel. Remarkably, this result still holds even when the instantaneous channel state information of the eavesdropper channel is not available at the legitimate nodes.
The ergodic result in [4] applies only to delay tolerant traffi c, e.g., file downloads. Early attempts at characterizing the delay limited secrecy capacity drew the negative conclusion that non-zero delay limited secrecy rates are not achievable, over almost all channel distributions, due to secrecy outage events corresponding to the instants when the eavesdropper channel gain is larger than the main one [6] , [8] . Later, it was shown in [12] that, interestingly, a non-zero delay limited secrecy rate could be achieved by introducing private key queues at both the transmitter and the receiver. These queues are used to store private key bits that are shared opportunis tically between the legitimate nodes when the main chan nel is more favorable th an th e one seen by th e eavesdropper.
These key bits are used later to secure the delay sensitive data using the Vemam one time pad approach [1]. Hence, secrecy outages are avoided by simply storing the secrecy generated previously, in the form of key bits, and using them whenever the channel conditions are more advantageous for the eavesdropper. A following work studied the key queue dynamics and power control strategies for this system [13] .
However, these works stopped short of proving sha r p capacity results or deriving the corresponding optimal power contro I policies. To that end, in this paper we study the secrecy outage capacity characterization of th e block fading wiretap chan nel. Note that, we provide some intuition and very brief sketches 978-1-4673-3140-1/12/$31.00 ©2012 IEEE of the proofs of our theorems. Full proofs can be found in [14] .
II. SY STEM MODEL
We study a point-to-point wireless communication link, in which a transmitter is trying to send information to a legitimate receiver, under the presence of a passive eavesdropper. We divide time into discrete slots, where blocks are formed by N channel uses, and B blocks combine to form a super-block. Let the communication period consist of S super-blocks. We use the notation (s, b) to denote the U h block in the st h super block. We adopt a block fading channel model, in which the channel is assumed to be constant over a block, and changes randomly from one block to the next. Within each block (s, b), the observed signals at the receiver and at the eavesdropper are: vectors, whose elements are drawn from standard complex normal distribution. We assume that the channel gains of the main channel Gm(s, b) and the eavesdropper channel Ge(s, b) are i.i.d. complex random variables. The power gains of the fading channels are denoted by Hm(s, b) = IGm(s, bW and He(s, b) = IGe(s, bW. We sometimes use the vector notation HU = [HmU HeU] for simplicity, and also use the notation Hs, b = {H} �;: 1 b ' = l to denote the set of channel gains H(SI, b/) observed un t il block (s, b). We use similar notation for other signals as well, and denote the sample realization sequences with lowercase letters. We assume that the probability density function of instantaneous channel gains, denoted as f(h), is well defined, and is known by all parties.
We define channel state information (CSI) as one's knowledge of the instantaneous channel gains. We define full transmitter CSI as the case in which the transmitter has full causal knowledge of the main and eavesdropper channel gains. We define main transmitter CSI as the case in which that the transmitter only knows the CSI of the legitimate receiver. In both cases, the eavesdropper has complete knowledge of both the main and the eavesdropper channels. Let P(s, b) denote the power allocated at block (s, b). We consider a long term power constraint (or average power constraint) such that,
Let {W(s, b)};�� b = l denote the set of messages to be transmitted with a de i ay constraint. W(s, b) becomes available at the transmitter at the beginning of block (s, b), and needs to be securely communicated to the legitimate receiver at the end of that particular block. We consider the problem of constructing (2 NR , N) codes to communicate message packets W(s, b) E {I, ··· ,2 NR } of equal size, which consists of: 1) A stochastic encoder that maps (w(s,b), xs, b -1 ) to
x(s, b) based on the available CSI, where xs, b -1 sum marizes the previously transmitted signals], and 2) A decoding function that maps ys, b to w(s,b) at the legitimate receiver.
Note that we consider the current block x ( s, b) to be a function of the past blocks xs, b -1 as well. This kind of generality allows us to store shared randomness to be exploited in the future to increase the achievable secrecy rate.
Define the error event with parameter 15 at block (s, b) as
which occurs either when the decoder makes an error, or when the power expended is greater than P(s,b) + 15. 
where the equivocation outage 
are satisfied for all (s, b), s =I-1.
(3)
We call such R an E-achievable secrecy rate. Note that the security constraints are not imposed on the first super-block.
Definition 2:
The E-achievable secrecy capacity is the supremum of E-achievable secrecy rates R.
Remark 1: The notion of secrecy outage was previous defined and used in [6] , [8] . However, those works did not I An exception is for b = 1, in which case the previous signals are summarized by xs-1,B
consider the technique of storing shared randomness for future use, and in that case, secrecy outage depends only on the instantaneous channel states. In our case, secrecy outage depends on previous channel states as well. Note that we do not impose a secrecy outage constraint on the first superblock (s = 1). We refer to the first superblock as an initialization phase used to generate initial common randomness between the legitimate nodes. Note that this phase only needs to appear once in the communication lifetime of that link. In other words, when a session (which consists of S superblocks) between the associated nodes is over, they will not need to go through the initialization step again before the subsequent sessIOns.
III. CAPACITY RESULTS
In this section, we investigate this capacity under two different cases; full CSI and main CSI at the transmitter. Before giving the capacity results, we define the following quantities. For a given power allocation function P( s, b), let Rm(s,b) and Rs(s,b) be as follows,
where [ . ] + = max C 0). Note that, RmO is the supremum of achievable main channel rates, without the secrecy constraint.
Also, Rs ( . ) is the non-negative difference between main chan nel and eavesdropper channel's supremum achievable rates. We define memory less power allocation strategy as a mapping from the available instantaneous CSI to jR+. We consider 2 the set of memory less power allocation strategies P. For full CSI, a memory less power allocation policy is a function of h(s, b) = [hm(s, b) he(s, b)] . For simplicity, we drop the block index (s, b), and use the notation P (h) for a memoryless power allocation policy. Similarly, with main CSI memory less power allocation policies are functions of hm(s, b) only, and we use the notation P(hm) for the stationary power allocation policy. In both cases, since the secrecy rate Rs(s, b), and the main channel rate Rm(s, b) are completely determined by the power allocation functions PO and channel gains h, we will interchangeably use the notations Rs(s, b) == Rs(h, P) and Rm(s, b) == R m(h, P). 
2Note that. it is shown in [14] that a memOlyless power allocation strategy achieves the E achievable secrecy capacity.
where the set pi <;;; P consists of power control policies P (h) that satisfies the following conditions. Here, we give a brief intuition on the result. For a given P(h), Rs(h, P) the supremum of the secret key generation rates within a block that experiences channel gains h [3] .
This implies that the expected achievable secrecy rate [4] is IE[Rs(H, P)] without the outage constraint. With the outage constraint, the fluctuations of Rs(H, P) due to fading are unacceptable, since Rs (H, P) can go below the desired rate when the channel conditions are unfavorable (e.g., when
Hm < He, Rs(H, P) = 0). Hence, we utilize the system illustrated in Figure 1 to address this issue. In our system, secret key buffers smoothen out these fluctuations to provide secrecy rate of IE[Rs(H, P)] at each block. The generated secret key bits are stored in secret key buffers of both the transmitter and receiver, and they are utilized to secure data of same size using Vernam's one-time pad technique. With the allowable amount of secrecy outages, the secrecy rate goes up to IE[Rs(H, P)l/(l -E) . Equation (8) on the other hand, ensures that channel outage probability is at most 1', hence it is a necessary condition to satisfy the secrecy outage constraint in (4) due to (2 Figure 2 , we study the performance of two strategies with the goal of achieving secrecy rate of R = 1. In strategy 1, the available instantaneous secrecy rate is used greedily, hence in block 2, secrecy outage occurs when Rs = O. Strategy 2 is our achievable scheme in Theorem 1. We can see that with this strategy, excess secrecy in block 1 are stored in the fonn of secret key bits, and they are used to secure the data in block 2, hence secrecy outage is avoided. bits of secret key can be extracted by using a universal hash function.
In [14] , we prove that
Thus, in the high power regime, the power allocation policy has minimal impact on the achievable key rate. Our simulation results also illustrate this fact. On the other hand, when the average power is limited, the optimality of the power allocation function is of critical importance, which is the focus of the following section.
IV. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION STRATEGY

A. Full CSI
The optimal power control strategy, P*(h) is the stationary strategy that solves the optimization problem (7)- (9) . In this section, we will show that P*(h) is a time-sharing between the channel inversion power policy, and the secure waterfilling policy. We first introduce the channel inversion power policy, 
where the set pI! <;;; P consists of power control policies P(hm) that satisfies the following conditions. 
Although the problems (7)-(9) and (10)-(12) are of the same fonn, due to the absence of eavesdropper CSI, the maxi mization in this case is over power allocation functions pI! that depend on the instantaneous main channel state only.
Hence, CM :::; CF' As in the full CSI case, our achievable scheme uses similar key buffers and Vernam's one time pad technique to secure the message. The main difference is the generation of secret key bits. Due to the lack of knowl edge of He (s, b) at the transmitter, secret key bits cannot be generated within a block. Instead, using the statistical knowledge of He(s, b), we generate keys over a super-block.
he hm
We call it the 'secure waterfilling' power policy because it maximizes the ergodic secrecy rate without any outage constraint, and resembles the traditional 'waterfilling' power control policy without secrecy. Here, the parameter A deter 
where lE[Rs(H, P*)] is the expected secrecy rate under the power allocation policy P*(h).
Due to (17), the optimal power allocation function is a time-sharing between the channel allocation power alloca tion function and secure waterfilling; a balance between avoiding channel outages, hence secrecy outages, and max imizing the expected secrecy rate. The time sharing region Q(A, k) determines the instants h, for which avoiding chan nel outages are guaranteed through the choice of P(h) = max(P;nv(h, R), Pwf(h, A)). Equation (19) ensures that chan nel outage probability is at most E, and (20) ensures that average power constraint is met with equality. (18) , on the other hand, is an immediate consequence of (7) .
Note that, an extreme case is P*(h) = Pwf(h, A*) \fh, which occurs when P;nv(h, R) :s; Pwf(h, A*) for any h E Q(A*,k*), which means that the secure waterfilling solution itself satisfies the channel outage probability in (8) . However, that the other extreme P*(h) = P;nv(h, R*), \fh cannot occur for any non-zero E due to (17). The parameter CF can be found graphically as shown in Figure 3 We have found that for R = ��8 € bits/channel use is achievable with E probability of secrecy outage with no power control, i.e., P(h) = 0.5 \fh. Let E = 0.2, we will see if we can do better than R = 1 with power control. Solving the problem (17)-(20), we can see that4 the time-sharing, and power expended in each state are as given in Tables III and IV Here, we provide the optimal power control strategy P*(hm), which solves the optimization problem (10)- (12) . Let The graphical solution in Figure 3 to find CF also generalizes to the main CSI case.
V. SIZING THE KEY BUFFER
The capacity results of Section III assume availability of infinite size secret key buffers at the transmitter and receiver, which mitigate the effect of fluctuations in the achievable secret key bit rate due to fading. Finite-sized buffers, on the other hand will lead to a higher secrecy outage probability due to wasted key bits by the key buffer overflows. We revisit the full CSI problem, and we consider this problem at a 'packet' level, where we assume a packet is of fixed size of N bits.
We provide the following result. 
We can interpret the result as follows. If buffer size is infinite, we can achieve rate CF with E probability of secrecy outage.
With finite buffer, we can achieve the same rate only with some E' > E probability of secrecy outage. Considering this difference to be the price that we have to pay due to the finiteness of the buffer, we can see that the buffer size required scales with 0 (-, I -lo bO" -+-), as E' -E ---+ O.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we conduct simulations to illustrate our main results with two examples. In the first example, we analyze the relationship between the f-achievable secrecy capacity and the average power. We assume that both the main channel and eavesdropper channel are characterized by Rayleigh fading, where the main channel and eavesdropper channel power gains follow an exponential distribution with a mean 2 and 1, respectively. In Figure 4 , we plot the f-achievable secrecy capacity as a function of the average power for secrecy outage probability f = 0.02, under both full CSI and main CSI cases.
It can be observed that the gap between capacities under full CSI and main CSI vanishes as average power increases, which support the result (13) . Average Power, P Fig. 4 . The E-achievable secrecy capacities as a function of average power,
Pavg
Next, we study the relationship between the secrecy outage probability and the buffer size for a given rate. We assume that both the main and eavesdropper channel gains follow a chi-square distribution of degree 2, with a mean 2 and 1, respectively. We focus on the full CSI case. In Figure 5 , we plot the secrecy outage probabilities, denoted with f', as a function of buffer size M. On the same graph, we also plot our asymptotic result given in Theorem 5, which provides an upper bound on the required buffer size to achieve f' outage probability for rate CF' with the assumption that (25) is met with equality for any f'. We can see that, this theoretical result serves as an upper bound on the required buffer size when f' -f, additional secrecy outages due to key buffer overflows, is very small.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper obtained sharp characterizations of the secrecy outage capacity of block flat fading channels under the as sumption full and main CSI at the transmitter. In the two cases, our achievability scheme relies on opportunistically exchanging private keys between the legitimate nodes and using them later to secure the delay sensitive information. We further derive the optimal power control policy in each scenario revealing an interesting structure based by judicious time sharing between time sharing and the optimal strategy for the ergodic. Finally, we investigate the effect of key buffer overflow on the secrecy outage probability.
